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Abstract There is a ‘‘Pragmatist turn’’ visible in the field
of organization science today, resulting from a renewed
interest in the work of Pragmatist philosophers like Dewey,
Mead, Peirce, James and others, and in its implications for
the study of organizations. Following Wicks and Freeman
(1998), in the past decade Pragmatism has also entered the
field of business ethics, which, however, has not been
uniformly applauded in that field. Some (Critical) scholars
fear that Pragmatism may enhance already existing posi-
tivist and managerialist tendencies in current business
ethics, while others see more emancipatory potential in
Pragmatism, arguing that it complements and supports
stakeholder theory. In this paper, a comparison of the
philosophical underpinnings of Pragmatist and Critical
conceptions of business ethics is offered, concentrating on
the Pragmatism of John Dewey and the Critical theory of
the Frankfurt School, in particular of Axel Honneth. It is
argued that these two developed along two converging
lines. Along the first line, Dewey was far more skeptical
and critical of capitalism than is often thought. Along the
second line, the reactions to Pragmatism of Frankfurt
School Critical theorists developed over time from gener-
ally hostile (Horkheimer, Marcuse), to partially inclusive
(Habermas), to more fully integrative (Honneth). At the
crossroads of these converging lines a Pragmatist Critical
perspective is developed and exemplified, and its impli-
cations for business ethics are outlined.
Keywords Pragmatism  Critical theory  Frankfurt
school  John Dewey  Axel Honneth
Introduction
There is a ‘‘Pragmatist turn’’ visible in the field of orga-
nization science today, resulting from a renewed interest in
the work of Pragmatist philosophers like Dewey, Mead,
Peirce, James and others, and in its implications for the
study of organizations (e.g., Farjoun et al. 2015; Keleman
and Rumens 2008; Martela 2015; Simpson 2009). The
influence of Pragmatism appears most visible in studies of
organizational learning (e.g., Argyris and Scho¨n 1996;
Brandi and Elkjaer 2004, 2011 ), organizational routines
(e.g., Cohen 2007; Winter 2013), reflective practice (e.g.,
Jordan 2010; Scho¨n 1992; Yanow and Tsoukas 2009) and
sensemaking (e.g., Colville et al. 2014; Elkjaer and
Simpson 2011; Weick 2004, 2006). Following Wicks and
Freeman (1998), in the past decade Pragmatism has also
entered the field of business ethics (e.g., Jacobs 2004;
Jensen and Sandstro¨m 2013; Singer 2010; Surie and Ashley
2008).
This emerging ‘‘Pragmatist turn’’ in business ethics has
not been uniformly applauded in the field. Some scholars,
in particular those involved in Critical management stud-
ies, fear that Pragmatism may enhance already existing
positivist and managerialist tendencies in current business
ethics, intent on prescribing rules, codes and guidelines for
managerial conduct that, however, do not touch on the
nature of the capitalist production system, with its
emphases on profit, efficiency and productivity (e.g.,
Painter-Morland and Ten Bos 2016; Parker 2003; Stokes
2011; Wray-Bliss 2009). Other scholars see more eman-
cipatory potential in Pragmatism, arguing that it
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complements and supports stakeholder theory, in which
managers and firms are exhorted to look beyond narrow
shareholder interests to include environmental concerns
and the interests of employees, clients and the community-
at-large (e.g., Jacobs 2004; Parmar et al. 2010; Wicks and
Freeman 1998).
Underlying this dissension about the ‘‘Pragmatist turn’’
in business ethics appears to be the question to what extent
Pragmatist and Critical conceptions of business ethics are
compatible in a philosophical and a practical sense (Pain-
ter-Morland and Ten Bos 2011; Singer 2010). This paper
intends to address that question. To do that in a somewhat
manageable way, it is proposed to pin down both concep-
tions to more concrete philosophers and schools. Regarding
Pragmatism, this paper concentrates on John Dewey
(1859–1952). Arguably more than that of Mead, Peirce or
James, Dewey’s work has been instrumental in making
Pragmatism dominant in American philosophy (Bernstein
2010; Evans 2000; Keleman and Rumens 2008). Current
day philosophers of different stripes have publicly classed
Dewey with Wittgenstein, Russell and Heidegger as one of
the most influential philosophers of the twentieth century
(Habermas 1998; Rorty 2003). Furthermore, Dewey’s work
appears particularly important for organizational and pub-
lic life:
More fully than any other philosopher of modern
times, Dewey put philosophy to the service of soci-
ety… The ends he sought were public, not private.
Truth was, to him, not merely what worked for the
individual but what worked for the group, and it was
to be achieved by cooperative action (Commager
1950, p. 99; Stever 1993; Thayer 1967).
Regarding Critical theory, this paper concentrates on the
Frankfurt School in social philosophy, in particular on the
work of Axel Honneth. The work of this School is com-
monly regarded as a particularly important source of the-
oretical inspiration of Critical management and
organization studies (e.g., Adler et al. 2008; Alvesson et al.
2009; Carr 2000; Jermier 1998; Visser 2010). Among
current third-generation Frankfurt scholars, Axel Honneth
‘‘figures as the undisputed gravitational center’’ (Anderson
2011, p. 46; Keucheyan 2013; Outhwaite 2009; Zurn
2015), whose ‘‘ideas have yet to be widely taken up by
Critical students of management’’ (Alvesson and Willmott
2012, p. 261; Scherer 2009).
To address this question, the argumentation of this paper
runs along two converging lines. Along the first line, the
Pragmatism of Dewey is broadly outlined, whereby it is
asserted that Dewey was far more skeptical and critical of
capitalism than is often thought, by mainstream organiza-
tional scientists and Critical theorists alike. Along the
second line, the reactions to Pragmatism of those Critical
theorists are outlined, which developed over time from
generally hostile (Horkheimer, Marcuse), to partially
inclusive (Habermas), to more fully integrative (Honneth)
(Hartmann 2009; Joas 1992, 1993; Zurn 2015). At the
crossroads of these converging lines, a Pragmatist Critical
perspective is developed and discussed on the basis of a
concrete case example, after which implications for busi-
ness ethics are outlined. Finally, the paper ends with dis-
cussion and conclusions. Throughout this paper, business
ethics is defined as the ‘‘discipline of questioning whether
we still agree with what is commonly accepted as right and
wrong in [organizations]’’ (Painter-Morland and Ten Bos
2011, p. 9).
Pragmatism, Dewey and Social Intelligence
Pragmatism as a general philosophy arose as a distinct
American revolt against Idealism in late nineteenth and
early twentieth century philosophy (Commager 1950;
Hollinger 1980). Inspired by Darwin’s theory of evolution,
Pragmatists in general emphasized the variations and
struggles of the organism in meeting and coping with the
environment (Almeder 1987; Ormerod 2006).
Initially inspired by Hegel, but later on ‘‘naturalizing
Hegel’’ by building on Darwin, Dewey viewed this meeting
and coping as a transaction between the organism and its
environment (Bernstein 2010, p. 92; Frega 2015; Smith
1973). However, from Hegel he retained the notion of ‘‘the
social organism [and] worked from the fundamental belief
that individual self-realization, the central motif of his
early and late ethical theory, is bound to the development
of the whole’’ (Deen 2013, pp. 649–650, italics added;
Zanetti and Carr 2000). Further, he retained from Hegel an
emphasis on wholes and a rejection of dualisms. Thus, for
example, he rejected the artificial distinction between
stimuli and response, popular in early twentieth century
behaviorist psychology (Dewey 1896): ‘‘the so-called
stimulus, being the total state of the organism, moves of
itself, because of the tensions contained, into those activi-
ties… which are called the response. The stimulus is
simply the earlier part of the total coordinated serial
behavior and the response the later part’’ (Dewey 1938,
p. 30; Lee 1973).
On this basis, transaction as a balanced, coordinated and
effectively integrated adaptation involves habits: flexible but
ordered activities, established on the basis of past success-
fully consummated activities of exploration and search.
However, these habits may at any point be disturbed by
changes in the environment and in the human individual, as it
grows and develops itself. In fact, the continuous dynamic of
order—interruption—recovery is a fundamental feature of
human experience, according to Dewey (1922, pp. 178–179;
M. Visser
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Smith 1973): ‘‘The truth is that in every waking moment, the
complete balance of the organism and its environment is
constantly interfered with and as constantly restored… Life
is interruptions and recoveries…’’
Such interruptions in the continuity of experience,
understanding and acting lead to an indeterminate or
problematic situation, seeded with doubt and full of
uncertainty and conflicting tendencies. It is important to
note that, to Dewey, indeterminacy is a characteristic of the
situation viewed as a ‘‘contextual whole… [in which] an
object or event is always a special part, phase or aspect, of
an environing experienced world… there is always a field
in which observation of this or that object or event occurs’’
(Dewey 1938, pp. 66–67; original italics). As such, inde-
terminacy is not reducible to the mental states of the
individuals in that situation: ‘‘We are doubtful because the
situation is inherently doubtful.’’ Attempts to clear up an
indeterminate situation by only attending to the states of
mind of the individuals involved would in fact encourage
withdrawal from reality and other pathological symptoms.
Instead, the indeterminate situation should be subject to a
process of inquiry, bringing forth the phase of recovery
(Dewey 1938, p. 105; Smith 1973).
Inquiry is defined by Dewey (1938), pp. 104–105 as
‘‘the controlled or directed transformation of an indeter-
minate situation into one that is so determinate in con-
stituent distinctions and relations as to convert the elements
of the original situation into a unified whole.’’ As such,
inquiry involves a ‘‘reflective evaluation of existing con-
ditions—of shortcomings and possibilities—with respect to
operations intended to actualize certain potentialities of the
situation so as to resolve what was doubtful’’ (Thayer 1967,
pp. 434–435). Moving toward determination of a prob-
lematic situation involves dialectically progressive steps
toward searching out the constituents of a given situation
and settle them by observation, develop ideas about pos-
sible solutions, and put them into operation (Dewey 1938;
George 1973).
Inquiry primarily takes place in a social context, since
human individuals are subject to shared problems and
dependent upon each other for survival. Inquiry as a social
process includes a community of inquirers who reach
agreement upon consequences, and thus jointly confirm or
correct results and outcomes of inquiry. Conducive to this
process is democracy, and Dewey favored extending the
reach of democracy from the political arena to other parts
of society, such as education and industrial organizations.
In this way, individuals would be enabled to use inquiry to
critique and redevelop these organizations in social and
intelligent ways (Deen 2011; Dewey 1938; Ormerod 2006;
Williams 1970).
This was important to Dewey, because he saw an
essential role for public and private organizations in
sustaining human freedom and liberal democracy against
the threats of modern technology and technocracy. These
threats involved disorientation and confusion among citi-
zens, which could lead to pervasive institutional change,
and most importantly, to social and cultural instability
(Evans 2000; Stevers 1993). Dewey was ambivalent about
these organizations, in particular about the new industrial
corporations of his days. On the one hand, he admired their
efficiency and effectiveness, and saw important moral
obligations for them in sustaining and reforming society.
At least in principle, the societal division of labor in these
corporations permitted ever more cooperation and
exchange of goods and services, and thus afforded ‘‘one the
fundamental expressions of the organic nature of society in
which members are reciprocally ends to each other’’
(Dewey and Tufts 1908, p. 486). Even machine production
could be viewed positively in this light, because ‘‘it is the
machine which makes possible on a tremendously effective
basis the division of labor and its social organization’’
(Dewey and Tufts 1908, p. 507; Deen 2013).
On the other hand, Dewey saw that these large corpo-
rations, and the capitalist economic system that sustained
them, did not fulfill these moral obligations. On the con-
trary, their ‘‘exclusive reliance upon the profit motive and
upon the supreme importance of wealth tends to distort the
proper perspective for life as a whole’’ (Dewey and Tufts
1908, p. 488). This distortion was endemic to American
society as a whole, with its emphasis on money and
materialism:
Our materialism, our devotion to money making and
to having a good time, are not things by themselves.
They are the product of the fact that we live in a
money culture; of the fact that our technique and
technology are controlled by interest in private profit.
There lies the serious and fundamental defect of our
civilization (Ratner 1939, p. 405; Williams 1970).
The capitalist system in fact prevented a rational,
intelligent organization of society, to the extent that it
represented a waste of labor and resources by alienating
workers from their work and its fruits, by failing to provide
them with an opportunity to contribute their physical,
intellectual and moral energies to the attainment of the
common good, and by restricting production in the name of
profit maximization where expansion of production would
be desirable and necessary for society as a whole (Deen
2013; Evans 2000; Williams 1970):
Making things is frantically accelerated; and every
mechanical device used to swell the senseless bulk.
As a result most workers find no replenishment, no
renewal and growth of mind, no fulfillment in work.
They labor to get mere means of later satisfaction.
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This when procured is isolated in turn from produc-
tion and is reduced to a barren physical affair or a
sensuous compensation for normal goods denied.
Meantime the fatuity of severing production from
consumption, from present enriching of life, is made
evident by economic crises, by periods of unem-
ployment alternating with periods of exercise, work
or ‘‘over-production’’ (Dewey 1922, p. 272).
The development of the corporations should not be
separated from developments in society and technology.
Extolling the virtues of capitalism and its captains of
industry distracted attention from the basic fact that
the entire modern industrial development is the fruit
of the technological applications of science. By and
large, the economic changes of recent centuries have
been parasitic upon the advances made in natural
science. There is not a single process involved in the
production and distribution of goods that is not
dependent upon the utilization of results which are
consequences of the method of collective, organic
intelligence working in mathematics, physics, and
chemistry. To speak baldly, it is plain falsehood that
the advances which the defenders of the existing
regime point to as justification for its continuance are
due to mere individualistic initiative and enterprise.
Individualistic initiative and enterprise have seques-
tered and appropriated the fruits of collective coop-
erative intelligence… Without the aid and support of
organized intelligence they would have been impo-
tent (Ratner 1939, pp. 360–361).
To remedy this situation, Dewey envisioned an ‘‘intel-
ligent social control of production,’’ restructuring corpo-
rations into vital, experimental and democratic
organizations that should be able to solve societal problems
through dialectical cooperation between managers,
employees and citizens in a community-like fashion (Deen
2013, p. 651; Stever 1993).
Critical Theory and the Reception of Deweyan
Pragmatism
The Critical theory of the Frankfurt School arose as a
distinct German philosophical reaction against the capi-
talist mode of production in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth century and the accompanying dominant position
of instrumental reason in capitalist society. Inspired by
Hegel’s dialectics, Marx’s critique of capitalism and
Luka´cs’s radical reinterpretation thereof, Freudian psy-
choanalysis, and Weber’s thesis of the ‘‘iron cage,’’ Critical
theorists in general critiqued the loss of individual freedom
and self-actualization, resulting from alienating and reify-
ing capitalist and bureaucratic forces that turn human
subjects into exchangeable objects or commodities
(‘‘Verdinglichung’’) (Honneth 2004a, 2008; Jay 1973;
Keucheyan 2013; Langman 2014).
In an early important programmatic paper, Max Hor-
kheimer (1937) made a fundamental distinction between
‘‘traditional’’ and ‘‘Critical’’ theory. Traditional theory is
distinct and separate from reality. It aims to develop uni-
versal systems of theories, from which hypotheses are
deduced that are compared to empirical observations in a
process of verification. While traditional theorists thus
seem to remain aloof of the reality they are studying, what
they are really doing is to treat their own activities, which
are governed by the societal division of labor (i.e., capi-
talism), as having an objective and independent status.
Critical theory rejects the ‘‘traditional’’ differentiations
between science and the world, objects and subjects, the
theoretical and the empirical, fact and value. Instead of
viewing interests and purposes as given facts, Critical
theory
attempts to impart to social life in its totality a
rational form and does not limit itself to working
within the framework of the given system of the
division of labor… [It] is confronted with the task of
justifying its own problems and their differentiation
and has to adjust its internal structure accordingly. It
does not set up an unchanging system but sees as its
purpose the attempt to apply the knowledge that has
been accumulated in the traditional theories to the
social totality in the direction that Critical theory
itself indicates (Horkheimer 1937, pp. 292–293).
One promising way to do this is to investigate the actual
activities of social agencies in the light of their espoused
values, without prima facie accepting these as valid or
evident, but also without resorting to a normative dogma-
tism that would somehow be beyond a Critical analysis
itself. Such an investigation most likely
will disclose a pervasive discrepancy between what
[social agencies] actually are and the values they
accept. [For] example, the media of public commu-
nication … constantly profess their adherence to the
individual’s ultimate value and his inalienable free-
dom, but they operate in such a way that they tend to
forswear such values by fettering the individual to
prescribed attitudes, thoughts, and buying habits. The
ambivalent relation between prevailing values and
the social context forces the categories of social
theory to become Critical and thus to reflect the
actual rift between the social reality and the values it
posits (Horkheimer 1941, p. 122).
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In this endeavor, almost from the moment the Frankfurt
School had completed its forced emigration from Hitler’s
Germany to Columbia University in 1934, its leading
members engaged with philosophical Pragmatism. In
general, they adopted a one-sided, hostile position toward it
(e.g., Adorno 1941; David 1937; Horkheimer 1935, 1937).
Partly this occurred because the ‘‘Frankfurt School gener-
ally remained outside the mainstream of American aca-
demic life. This allowed it to make assumptions, such as
the equation of pragmatism with positivism, that lacked
complete validity’’ (Jay 1973, p. 289), and which made
them overlook the early but distinct Hegelian imprint in
Dewey’s thinking. Partly this occurred because Dewey’s
economic thinking was dispersed over a vast number of
philosophical and non-theoretical works, and thus hard to
fathom in its entirety (Bernstein 2010; Deen 2013).
Horkheimer in particular saw Dewey as the most radical
and consistent Pragmatist philosopher. He critiqued
Dewey’s Pragmatism as ‘‘scientism,’’ in which ‘‘probabil-
ity, or better, calculability replaces truth,’’ and related it
directly to industrial society and its accompanying instru-
mental reason (Horkheimer 1947, p. 44). Although Hor-
kheimer acknowledged Dewey’s idea of freedom as the
fulfillment of desires and aspirations of people, reminiscent
of Hegel’s ideal of self-realization, he chided Dewey for
accepting these desires and aspirations at face value:
First, it may be taken to refer to the desires of people
as they really are, conditioned by the whole social
system under which they live a system that makes it
more than doubtful whether their desires are actually
theirs. If these desires are accepted in an uncritical
way, not transcending their immediate, subjective
range, market research and Gallup polls would be a
more adequate means for ascertaining them than
philosophy. Or, second, Dewey somehow agrees to
accept some kind of difference between subjective
desire and objective desirability. Such an admission
would mark just the beginning of Critical philo-
sophical analysis… (Horkheimer 1947, pp. 53–54).
The same themes appeared in two reviews of Dewey’s
books by Herbert Marcuse (1939, 1941). His first review
(of Dewey’s Logic) critiqued the reduction of theory to
mere method, which he saw exemplified in Dewey’s con-
cept of inquiry. His second review (of Dewey’s Theory of
Valuation) recalled how the original critical stance of
positivism and reason in relation to a given state of affairs
gradually became lost, and how this loss left Pragmatism as
positivism powerless to the rise of authoritarianism in
Europe. In this context Marcuse reviewed Dewey’s theory
of valuation, because Dewey had been mainly responsible
for bringing value judgments in the realm of positivist
science. Contrary to positivism, however, Dewey did seem
to apply a pre-theoretical standard or perspective, accord-
ing to which these ends can be revaluated, ‘‘namely, that
liberty and the ‘release of individual potentialities’ is better
than its opposite’’ (Marcuse 1941, p. 148). Dewey was
optimistic that if people should become conscious of spe-
cial class privileges and advantages, they would come to
revaluate them. Marcuse, however, cognizant of earlier
Frankfurt School research on authoritarian tendencies
among the German working class (Fromm
1932, 1936, 1941, 1984) and already foreshadowing later
research on the authoritarian personality (Adorno et al.
1950) was much more pessimistic (Deen 2011).
Contrary to first-generation Critical theorists, second-
generation Critical theorists like Habermas found ways to
partially include elements of Pragmatism in their Critical
philosophy, but still without cognizing Dewey’s economic
thinking. By the late 1960s, first-generation Critical theo-
rists had come to the conclusion that instrumental reason
had taken such a pervasive dominating hold on modern
society that even Critical philosophy itself had become
affected by it (Adorno 1966; Rose 1978). Progressively
rationalizing forces of bureaucracy and capitalism had
‘‘reified’’ the human spirit to such a large extent that
remnants of true spontaneity and freedom only could be
found in the irrational powers of love and art (Anderson
2011; Honneth 2005; Thompson 2015).
Habermas undertook a reconstruction of Critical theory
‘‘by embracing the real achievements of bourgeois
democracy while salvaging the project of modernity
specifically through a mobilized public sphere, revitalized
public discourse and personal involvement in politics’’
(Ray 2004, p. 309). An important role in this reconstruction
was played by Peirce’s ‘‘universal pragmatics,’’ which
focuses on an intersubjectively founded validity of beliefs
as both the process and outcome of inquiry. Unlike first-
generation Critical theorists, Habermas no longer regarded
the normative wrongness of rationalizing bureaucratic and
capitalist forces as self-evident, but his ‘‘theory of com-
municative action locates the potential for an anthropo-
logically grounded reason… in the quintessentially human
activity of reaching a linguistically mediated understand-
ing’’ (Ray 2004, p. 309; Strydom 2011). This potential
enabled Habermas to focus on the specific conditions under
which human communication could be free from domina-
tion (the ‘‘ideal speech’’ situation), while at the same time
still critiquing the domination of instrumental rationality,
found in the ‘‘mediatization,’’ ‘‘instrumentalization’’ and
‘‘colonization’’ of the ‘‘life world’’ by capitalist and
bureaucratic ‘‘systems’’ (Anderson 2011; Joas 1993; Ray
2004).
While Habermas incorporated aspects of especially
Peirce’s pragmatics in his theory of communicative action,
in three other aspects he remained distant from especially
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Dewey’s Pragmatism. First, like Horkheimer (1947) and
Marcuse (1941) before him, Habermas did not share the
democratic optimism of Dewey (and Peirce for that mat-
ter). Partly based on German historical experience and
partly on ‘‘his theoretical commitment to a vigilant con-
ception of Critical reason,’’ Habermas distrusted common
sense and was very doubtful about the possibilities of
reconstructing industrial corporations and political systems
in more democratic and experimental ways, as Dewey
envisioned (Anderson 2011, p. 42; Denzin 1996; Joas
1992). Second, this aloofness from Dewey’s ‘‘problems of
men’’ gave Habermas’ theory an abstract, quasi-transcen-
dental character that makes it difficult to connect the
requirements of ‘‘ideal speech’’ situations to concrete
agency in the political or organizational world (Denzin
1996; Peters 1994; Ray 2004). Third, Habermas’ theory
appeared to privilege consensus over continuous and
relentless inquiry, ignoring that consensus always involves
power and some form of exclusion, for example of weaker
voices defined by class, race or gender (Cohen 1990;
Denzin 1996; Zanetti and Carr 2000).
Honneth and Dewey: Toward Convergence
It remained for the leading third-generation Critical theorist
Axel Honneth to more fully integrate Dewey’s Pragmatism
with Critical philosophy, including parts of Dewey’s eco-
nomic thinking (Anderson 2011; Frega 2015; Midtgarden
2012; Strydom 2011; Zurn 2015). Fundamental to Hon-
neth’s social philosophy is Hegel’s conception of freedom
as intersubjectively constituted through mutual recognition.
It is essential for the self-realization and identity devel-
opment of persons to be recognized by other persons
(Brownlee 2015; Honneth 2010a; 2014; Klikauer 2012).
Self-realization as the development of a positive individual
identity requires three patterns of recognition. The first
pattern, love, refers to the degree to which affective and
physical needs are met by proximal significant others and
provides basic self-confidence. Misrecognition and disre-
spect here involve contempt as the violation of physical
and psychological integrity. The second pattern, respect,
refers to the degree to which persons are seen as morally
responsible agents and bearers of equal legal, social and
political rights and provides self-respect. Misrecognition
and disrespect here involve structural exclusion as the
denial of legal, social and political rights to fully partici-
pate in and be respected as a member of society. The third
pattern, esteem, refers to the degree to which traits and
abilities of persons are positively perceived and evaluated
and provides self-esteem. Misrecognition and disrespect
here involve the denial or depreciation of a person’s con-
tribution to a group or society, based on that person’s traits,
convictions, ways of life and other attributes (Honneth
1992, 1995, 2001).
Misrecognition and disrespect, either by individuals,
groups or society at large, convey a demeaning, degrading
or debasing message to persons or groups, which may
inflict real psychological and social harm and pain on those
persons or groups. As such, misrecognition and disrespect
constitute a violation of moral claims and normative
expectations persons and groups may have with regard to
the three patterns of recognition. The negative and painful
subjective ‘‘lived’’ experiences and emotions they undergo
and the struggle for societal recognition they undertake as a
result provide the normative core of Honneth’s social cri-
tique (Anderson 2011; Outhwaite 2009; Strydom 2011).
Rather than viewing the historical development of
society in terms of grand meta-narratives like the ‘‘eclipse
of reason’’ or the ‘‘colonization of the life world,’’ Honneth
directly goes to normative expectations that are available in
society itself in a process of normative reconstruction
(Honneth and Sutterlu¨ty 2011). Here Honneth suspects the
existence of pathological societal structures which may
structurally frustrate these normative expectations (An-
derson 2011; Honneth 2004a, 2010b; Outhwaite 2009).
Such structures principally emerge from globalizing
capitalism, but to a differential degree throughout recent
history. In the two decades after World War II, a state-
regulated capitalism emerged in which four normative
expectations were simultaneously realized: individualism
as a leading personal idea; an egalitarian conception of
legal and political justice; the idea of achievement as the
basis of social status; and the romantic idea of love.
Together these four expectations form an ‘‘institutionalized
normative surplus… [allowing] legitimizable claims that
point beyond the established social order’’ (Hartmann and
Honneth 2006, p. 42; Islam 2012; Zurn 2015).
In all of these four areas, there has been considerable
moral progress in the era from the late 1960s to the early
1980s. However, a demise of state-regulated capitalism
began in the 1980s, and continues until the present, as a
‘‘neo-liberal revolution’’ with three characteristics: disor-
ganized capitalism (characterized by globalizing firms,
internationalization of finance flows, fading of class-cul-
tural ties and weakening welfare state rules and safe-
guards); shareholder capitalism (leading to shareholder-
oriented management to the detriment of interests of other
stakeholders in firms) and the new spirit of flexible network
capitalism (requiring employees to invest their personal
abilities, motivations and emotional resources in their
work, instead of fulfilling hierarchically predetermined
jobs within large organizations). This neo-liberal capital-
ism has led to a reversal of these four institutionalized
normative expectations into normative paradoxes (Hart-
mann and Honneth 2006; Honneth 2004b, 2010b; Johnson
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2014). Reminiscent of Horkheimer’s (1941) exhortation to
look at ‘‘pervasive discrepancies’’ between espoused values
and actual activities of social agencies, the normative
paradoxes point at such discrepancies in current organiza-
tions and society.
For example, a reversal of the normative expectation of
individualism is visible in the view of employees as vari-
ously entrepreneurs of their own labor, intrapreneurs or
entreployees within their organizations, or as flexible
human resources taking responsibility for themselves. This
reversal is ethically problematic, because this particular
expectation of individualism is not matched by appropriate
material conditions ‘‘that would allow a consistent real-
ization of these new values. Instead, employees are com-
pelled to feign initiative, flexibility, and talents in places
where there are no roots for such values’’ (Honneth 2007,
p. 346; Islam 2012).The translation in fact involves a
paradoxical reversal of self-realization, from a feature of
personal identity development and growth into a institu-
tionalized, efficiency enhancing expectation, used as a pre-
text for the deregulation, flexibilization and ‘‘marketiza-
tion’’ of society, leading to symptoms of inner emptiness,
lack of purpose, burnout and feelings of superfluity within
employees (Honneth 2004b, 2007, 2010b; Petersen and
Willig 2004; Strydom 2011).
In the development of this thinking, Honneth
(1998, 2008, 2014) increasingly related to Dewey, in three
aspects (Frega 2015). The first aspect regards the devel-
opment of freedom as human self-realization, which
Dewey, naively Hegelian, first assumed to develop freely
and spontaneously in the direction of fulfilling social
obligations and contributing to the social whole. This being
too optimistic, Dewey then developed an
intersubjectivist theory of socialization… [in which
humans] from completely open drives… can develop
only those capabilities and needs as stable habits of
action that have met with approval and esteem of
their particular reference group… in the course of a
development of a personality, only socially useful
habits of action are formed (Honneth 1998,
pp. 771–772).
In this way, social cooperation is constituted by a form of
social behaviorism (Dewey 1896; Lee 1973): through iden-
tification with and recognition by reference groups, human
freedom as self-realization becomes socially embedded.
The second aspect regards the logic of inquiry that
Dewey took over from the logic of scientific research and
applied to society at large as a condition for social intel-
ligent problem-solving:
in social cooperation… the intelligence of the solu-
tion to emerging problems increases to the degree to
which all those involved could, without restraints and
with equal rights, exchange information and intro-
duce reflection… Dewey developed an epistemolog-
ical argument that proposed democracy as a condition
for increasing the rationality of solutions to social
problems… guarantee[ing] all members of society
something like communication free of domination
(Honneth 1998, pp. 772–773, 2014 p. 272; Zurn
2015).
The third aspect regards the internal connection between
social cooperation and democracy. Dewey saw that the
industrialization and concurrent growth in scale and com-
plexity of societal problems in his days did not enhance the
possibilities for grand-scale public inquiry into those
problems. However, for Dewey the solution for the
revitalization of democratic publics [was] located in
the prepolitical sphere of the social division of labor,
which has to be regulated in such a fair and just
manner that each member of society can understand
herself as an active participant in a cooperative
enterprise (Honneth 1998, p. 777,2014 pp. 330–331;
Zurn 2015).
A Pragmatist Critical Perspective on Business
Ethics: The Lidl Case
Through the various links between Honneth and Dewey,
the lines of Pragmatism and Critical theory appear to
converge at a Pragmatist Critical perspective (Frega
2014, 2015; Midtgarden 2012), which provides a normative
context for business ethics. This perspective acknowledges
the pre-theoretical importance of human freedom and self-
realization, seen as intersubjectively constituted through
mutual recognition. Humans generally have the capacity to
engage in societal and organizational problem-solving
through inquiry, seen as a process of social cooperation and
reflection. Democracy in society and organizations is
considered as a crucial condition for intelligent and rational
problem-solving, because it permits the application of the
mental, intellectual and physical capabilities of all people
involved. However, this perspective is generally suspicious
about the effects of the capitalist system on the possibilities
for human self-realization, cooperative inquiry and intel-
ligent problem-solving. Especially under the neo-liberal
capitalism of last three decades, normative expectations
about the recognition people may receive from and within
public and business institutions and organizations are
potentially structurally frustrated and turned into normative
paradoxes, which endanger the possibilities for people to
equally take part in and contribute to cooperative inquiry.
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Such normative paradoxes become directly visible as per-
vasive discrepancies between the promises and expecta-
tions that organizations and society espouse, but at the
same time do not match (or even grossly contradict) with
appropriate social, material and organizational conditions
that could realize these expectations.
In order to illustrate this Pragmatist Critical perspective,
the case example of the German retail discounter Lidl is
considered here. Founded in 1973 by Dieter Schwarz, it is
currently the second largest ‘‘hard discounter’’ in Germany
and rapidly expanding across Europe and the UK. In terms
of espoused employment and working conditions, on its
website Lidl (2017) promulgates a ‘‘management culture’’
in which it promises ‘‘to create a working environment that
encourages initiative and drive and promotes enjoyment
and satisfaction at work, [enabling] employees to work
effectively and successfully… and [to] support employees’
development.’’ This culture is supported by ‘‘management
principles’’ like:
We place confidence in our employees and trust that
they will complete all tasks to the best of their ability,
and that they will develop ideas and suggestions that
will benefit our business; we speak to each other
openly and promote honest, prompt and direct com-
munication; we treat each other fairly and respect-
fully; we honor our agreements with our employees
as a trustworthy partner; we give regular feedback to
our employees on their performance and conduct; we
support and motivate by recognition of achievements
and constructive criticism.
In terms of actual employment and working conditions,
however, the situation is quite different. These conditions
by Lidl across Europe are informed by a business model
that predominantly focuses on cost leadership, leading at
store level to an
…enormous management pressure to meet a few key
performance measures: sales per hours worked, sales
in relation to labor costs, waste… and inventory loss.
There are a myriad of standard operating procedures
in place in stores that are regularly controlled and
closely coupled with a system of sanctions and
repressive measures against store managers and
employees if they ‘‘underperform’’ (Geppert 2015,
pp. 100–101).
Under these conditions, verbal abuse and psychologi-
cal and physical intimidation by managers are the order
of the day. As a former employee attests, ‘‘they scream
and yell at you as if you were a small child, people who
by their age could have been my children.’’ After each
working day, employees’ coats, handbags and cars were
routinely searched for stolen goods, leading to an
atmosphere in which employees showed up without coats
or bags ‘‘for fear, they would put something in my
pockets’’ (Steinberger 2010, translation author). Also, for
a long time Lidl employed detectives who kept detailed
records on employees’ private lives, for example where
exactly on their bodies they had tattoos, whether their
friends used drugs, and how their personal financial sit-
uation developed. Within the stores, records were kept of
employees’ toilet visits during working hours and even of
their menstrual cycles: an internal memorandum at a Lidl
store advised that ‘‘female workers who have their peri-
ods may go to the toilet now and again, but to enjoy this
privilege they should wear a visible headband’’ (Connolly
2008; Geppert 2015).
Further, the exact governance structure of the overar-
ching Schwarz Group is unusually opaque, likened by a
German services union representative to a sewing pattern
with ‘‘hundreds if not thousands of overlapping and inter-
connected companies.’’ Shares are divided between two
foundations in order to avoid publishing financial results
for the whole organization. Union membership and
employee representation in works councils at the stores are
actively discouraged; according to the union representative,
‘‘outlets where workers organize themselves are often
closed to set an example’’ (Geppert et al. 2015; Oltermann
2014).
In terms of the Pragmatist Critical perspective devel-
oped in this paper, the situation at Lidl appears ethically
highly problematic. A quite pervasive discrepancy
between the espoused values and principles on the one
hand, and the actual activities and work practices on the
other is discernible. Clearly, what Lidl promises on its
website is grossly contradicted by existing social, mate-
rial and organizational conditions. Misrecognition and
disrespect seem involved in all spheres, as the physical
and psychological integrity of employees is invaded, their
rights to participate and be respected are denied, and
employees’ habits, traits, convictions and ways of life are
depreciated, even when they are displayed outside Lidl.
No effort is being made to engage employees in orga-
nizational problem-solving through social cooperation
and reflection. No use is being made of the mental,
intellectual and physical capabilities of employees. All
these factors greatly impair the possibilities of Lidl
employees to attain meaningful self-realization in their
jobs. The case generally confirms suspicions about the
effects of the capitalist system on the possibilities for
human self-realization, cooperative inquiry and intelligent
problem-solving within and through organizations. While
in many aspects a seemingly extreme case, it does not
appear to be far removed from recent developments in
industrial and retail organizations across the world (e.g.,
Moore and Robinson 2016; Peck 2013).
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Discussion and Conclusions
This paper addresses the question to what extent Pragmatist
and Critical conceptions of business ethics are compatible in a
philosophical and practical sense. It appears possible to arrive
at a Pragmatist Critical perspective on business ethics, through
a mutual emphasis on the socialized nature of recognition, the
rational solution of societal and organizational problems
through free and unrestrained social cooperation in inquiry,
and the pivotal importance of the social division of labor for
both human self-realization and democracy.
In spite of theoretical convergences, important points of
difference remain regarding the relation between theory and
practice. Dewey did not share Critical theory’s inclination
toward grand social meta-theorizing, against which he pos-
ited a more modest practice of ‘‘fresh and unbiased’’ inquiry
into concrete social problems and their causes (Frega 2014;
Bohman 2002; Strydom 2011). Further, Dewey did not share
Critical theory’s general distrust of the public capacity to
identify and resolve ‘‘pathologies of society,’’ but instead
proposed a joint liaison between intellectuals and the public
in detecting and correcting societal problems (Decker 2012;
Frega 2014; Joas 1992; Peters 1994). While thus mindful of
the dangers of capitalism and societal power inequalities,
Dewey was more optimistic and practice-oriented than most
Critical theorists about the possibilities of successful public
inquiry into societal problems.
However, two recent developments have brought some
convergence here as well. Recently scholars involved in
Critical management studies have revised their stance
toward practical societal problems and issues. Like the
Critical theorists in general, for a long time these Critical
management scholars tended to disengage from practice,
fearing colonization and perverting of their ideas by
practitioners (Visser 2010). However, their aloofness from
the ‘‘problems of men’’ more and more came to be
regarded as inconsistent with attempts to promote social
change, as reinforcing an inside-looking attitude, as pre-
venting the articulation of positive wants and desires
(instead of only negatively deconstructing the existing
situation), and as reinforcing a cynical consciousness, in
which Critical management scholars depend on and profit
from the same organizational world they critique (Butler
and Spoelstra 2014; Parker 2014). These concerns were
translated into a new view of Critical management studies
as Critically or progressively performative, purporting to
‘‘actively and subversively intervene in managerial dis-
course and practices,’’ guided by an affirmative stance, an
ethic of care, a pragmatic orientation, attending to
potentialities and a normative orientation (Spicer et al.
2009, p. 544, 2016; Hartmann 2014; Wickert and
Schaefer 2015).
These movements of Critical management scholars
toward practice have been accompanied by recent move-
ments of neo-Pragmatist scholars toward incorporating
Critical theory in practical social inquiry. Such inquiry
should not only be both interpretive and explanatory,
but also descriptive and normative at the same time. Such
inquiry assumes neither a pure ‘‘insider’’ and participant
standpoint (in the manner of hermeneutics), nor a pure
‘‘outsider’’ or observer standpoint (in the manner of
naturalistic social theories). This distinctively normative
standpoint characteristic of critical social inquiry… has
been called the ‘‘perspective of a critical-reflective par-
ticipant’’ (Bohman 2002, p. 503; Decker 2012).
It would amount to a form of social inquiry that starts
with concrete problem-solving, but in a ‘‘negatively
dialectical’’ process progressively delves deeper into the
structural causes of problems by continuously but cooper-
atively questioning taken-for-granted assumptions and
hegemonial power positions, by giving voice to normally
silent voices inside and outside the organization, and by
maintaining reflective openness until a particular deep form
of insight and learning has been attained (Parker 2003;
Spoelstra and Svensson 2016; Zanetti and Carr 2000).
Further, regarding practice, the example of Dewey as a
life-long social and political activist could be a source of
inspiration for Critical scholars to ‘‘Pragmatically walk their
Critical talk,’’ thus avoiding pervasive discrepancies in their
own daily working life (Butler and Spoelstra 2014; Parker
2014). This could entail that Pragmatist Critical scholars are
directly and actively involved in their own university, for
example in employee councils, work groups and depart-
mental meetings; that they apply Critical pedagogy in their
classes whenever possible or necessary, for example by
discussing different paradigms and bringing in Critical per-
spectives in mainstream business, economics and accounting
courses and by engaging students in thinking outside their
‘‘mental boxes’’ (Fleming and Banerjee 2016); that they are
vigilant in safeguarding an open, experimental and produc-
tive learning atmosphere against closed and defensive ide-
ological reasoning from both the right and the left (Magala
2006); that they do not tacitly accept existing management
hierarchies as given (Cabantous et al. 2016; Klikauer 2015),
but actively explore alternative forms of organization, for
example in cooperatives (Leca et al. 2014; Paranque and
Willmott 2014), communities (Adler 2001) or anarchical
forms (Wigger 2016).
As outlined in this paper, a Pragmatist Critical per-
spective contributes to a broadly emancipatory conception
of business ethics that goes beyond profit, efficiency and
productivity ends to consider environmental concerns and
the interests of employees, clients and the community-at-
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large. A prima facie, it appears to be in line with stake-
holder theory (e.g., Parmar et al. 2010; Wicks and Freeman
1998). However, stakeholder theory still basically is
stakeholder capitalism; in fact it is a particular libertarian
form of capitalism, championing personal freedom, indi-
vidual property rights and a minimal state. It considers
companies as merely apolitical voluntary associations, the
‘‘hegemony of the current order is natural and is generally
seen as non-problematic… the interaction between the
company and society is seen as harmonious and well
integrated’’ (Jensen and Sandstro¨m 2013, p. 233; Freeman
and Philips 2002). It seems that the reason why stakeholder
theory can be safely advanced over shareholder theory is
that relations between firms and society are considered
basically harmonious and unproblematic, in which business
ethics is viewed as a neutral pragmatist search for whatever
works within the larger framework of capitalist society, but
without questioning that framework itself.
A Pragmatist Critical perspective as conceived here
looks beyond the capitalist order for viable and liberating
alternatives. In the end, only one question regarding busi-
ness ethics is deemed all-important: to what extent are
humans considered as ‘‘means’’ for the attainment of cer-
tain ‘‘ends’’ (profit, efficiency, productivity, etc.) within
organizations or systems, and to what extent does that
prevent them from receiving full recognition as ‘‘ends’’ in
themselves, i.e., as human beings, full of potential toward
growth, self-realization and social self-determination.
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